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STATE COURT POWER TO ENJOIN FEDERAL
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS: DONOVAN V.
CITY OF DALLAS REVISITED
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN* & P. MICHAEL NAGLE**
I. INTRODUCTION
Few notions in American jurisprudence are as inextricably bound up
in concerns of federalism as that of the powers of federal and state
courts to interfere directly with each others' proceedings. The difficul-
ties presented by federal judicial interference with state proceedings
have been explored exhaustively by courts' and commentators. 2 The
converse problem of state court power to enjoin pending or impending
proceedings in federal courts has received far less attention, however.
What little analysis exists has emanated almost entirely from the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland. J.D. 1970, Rutgers University
School of Law (Newark).
** Associate, Hyatt & Rhoads, P.C., Washington, D.C. J.D. 1979, University of Maryland
School of Law.
1. Eg., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffinan v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. E.g., Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181 (1979); Calhoun, Ex-
haustion Requirements in Younger-Type Actions: More Mud in Already Clouded Waters, 13 IND.
L. REV. 521 (1980); Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Needfor Prospec-
tive Relief 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 193; Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 330 (1978); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: De/erence in Search of
a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463 (1978); Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44
U. CHI. L. REv. 717 (1977); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Inteference with State
Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REV. 591
(1975).
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Supreme Court's decision in Donovan v. City of Dallas.'
In that case, the Supreme Court ostensibly "finally and authorita-
tively resolved the issue, and resolved it against state court power.'' 4 As
to pending proceedings, the question has since been regarded as settled
by state5 and federal6 courts alike. Any speculation about the applica-
bility of the Donovan holding to cases in which federal proceedings had
not yet been instituted at the time a state court's injunction was sought
ended with Genera/Atomic Co. v. Felter.7 The Court summarily reaf-
firmed Donovan and extended the holding to include attempts to enjoin
federal proceedings that are merely impending.8
After examining the cases and the traditional analysis and criticism
of them, this Article will present an alternative theory of state power to
enjoin federal judicial proceedings. It is our theory that the judicial
proscription of state court injunction of in personam federal litigation
is less than absolute, the traditional analysis-blanket prohibition-to
the contrary notwithstanding. The Court in Donovan based its decision
primarily upon the petitioners' federal right to sue in federal court- a
right that "cannot be taken away by the State." 9 Given the supremacy
of federal law,' ° that proposition is unassailable. Not every prospective
3. 377 U.S. 408 (1964). See generally Arnold, State Power to Enjoin Federal Court Proceed-
ings, 51 VA. L. REv. 59 (1965); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994,
1053-55 (1965); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. CIHI. L,
REv. 471 (1965); Note, State Inunction of Proceedings in Federal Courts, 75 YALE L.J. 150 (1965);
49 MINN. L. REv. 344 (1964); 10 N.Y.L.F. 392 (1964); 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 832 (1965); 26 U. PITT. L.
REV. 147 (1964). See also Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345
(1930); Note, State Inunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 714
(1942).
4. Arnold, supra note 3, at 60.
5. E.g., Moody v. State exrel Payne, 295 Ala. 299, 307, 329 So. 2d 73, 79 (1976); Crawley v.
Bauchens, 57 Ill. 2d 360, 364-65, 312 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1974); Eddy ex rel. Pfeifer v. Christian
Science Bd., 62 IlM. App. 3d 918, 920, 379 N.E.2d 653, 655 (1978); Jamaica Hosp. v. Blum, 68
A.D.2d 1, 6, 416 N.Y.S.2d 294, 297 (1979).
6. See, ag., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 443 F,2d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 1971);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1312 (5th Cir.
1971) (dictum); Tampa Phosphate R.R. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 418 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir.
1969); Windbourne v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1130, 1163 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Carter v.
Bedford, 420 F. Supp. 927, 929 (W.D. Ark. 1976); Bekoff v. Clinton, 344 F. Supp. 642, 645
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7. 434 U.S. 12 (1977).
8. "It is therefore clear from Donovan that the rights conferred by Congress to bring in
personam actions in federal courts are not subject to abridgment by state court injunctions, re-
gardless of whether the federal litigation is pending or prospective." Id at 17.
9. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
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federal litigant, however, has a right to a federal adjudication. A liti-
gant must first establish that the case meets the constitutional and statu-
tory prerequisites to the assertion of federal judicial power.'" If the
litigant fails to meet these prerequisites, there is no federal right to a
federal forum 2 and the holding in Donovan is inapplicable.
In such a situation a state court might properly enjoin litigants sub-
ject to its control from filing or maintaining an in personam action in
federal court. To do so, the court would first need to determine that the
federal court was without power, which perforce raises questions re-
garding the competence of a state court to make this determination and
the effect that such a ruling should have in the event that a party seeks
to invoke federal jurisdiction despite a state court order forbidding it.
We do not intend to suggest that a state court may enjoin federal
court proceedings merely upon a showing of a lack of federal jurisdic-
tion over the parties or the subject matter.' 3 The injunctive power is
that of a court of equity. An applicant would be required not only to
show that the federal court was devoid of power to hear the case, but
also to demonstrate the existence of whatever state law might require to
justify injunctive relief.'4 Thus, the rather limited focus here is the
demonstration that there is no federal constitutional ban on state court
injunctions against federal proceedings, pending or impending, once a
state equity court determines that the federal court lacks jurisdiction.
II. THE CASES AND THE "RULE"
In Donovan v. City of Dallas,' citizens of Dallas, Texas had brought
a class action in state court, seeking to enjoin construction of an addi-
tional runway at the municipal airport and to bar the issuance of mu-
nicipal bonds to fund its construction.' 6  The trial court entered
11. See text accompanying notes 108-13 infra.
12. Whether the constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts
should be read as conferring a private right to a federal forum, as opposed to dividing power
between state and federal courts, is itself an intriguing question. See, e.g., Huffiman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 (1975).
13. 1 J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 125, at 148 (4th ed. 1905); 2 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 898, at 84-85 (12th ed. 1877).
14. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REmEDIES § 2.10 (1973).
15. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
16. The plaintiffs alleged that construction of the new runway and its subsequent use would
result in "noises, vibrations and disturbances" over their property, exposing them to "permanent
mental and physical injury" and doing "irreparable damage to their property due to increased
insurance rates, reduced rental values, etc .... without compensation and without exercising the
Number 1]
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summary judgment for the city, and the judgment was affirmed on ap-
peal.17 The Supreme Court of Texas denied review, and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari."' Thereafter, 120 Dallas citi-
zens, twenty-seven of whom had been parties to the state court action,
sought similar relief in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas. 9 Under Texas law the bonds that were to have
financed the construction could not be issued as long as litigation chal-
lenging them was pending.20 After an initial denial,21 the Texas
Supreme Court22 directed the Texas Court of Civil Appeals to grant the
city's motion for an injunction barring prosecution of the federal court
suit and initiation of any new proceedings by the plaintiffs.23 The fed-
eral district court then dismissed the case, and several of the plaintiffs
appealed.24 For this action, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited the
appellants for contempt.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review both the Texas Supreme Court's judgment directing the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals to enjoin the federal proceedings and the latter
court's judgment of conviction for contempt.26
Justice Black framed the question presented to the Court in Donovan
as "whether a state court can validly enjoin a person from prosecuting
an action in personam in a district or appellate court of the United
States which has jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject mat-
ter."27 The answer was predictable, if not inevitable. The Court first
power of eminent domain" implying that their property would be taken without due process of
law. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
939 (1962).
17. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (rex. Civ. App. 1961), cert. denled, 370 U.S.
939 (1962).
18. Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
19. Brown v. City of Dallas, No. 9276 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 1963).
20. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 409 (1964) (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1269j-5, § 3 (Vernon 1963)). See City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919, 925 (Tex. 1963).
21. City of Dallas v. Brown, 362 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
22. City of Dallas v. Dixon, 365 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1963).
23. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 410 (1964).
24. Id
25. City of Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W.2d 240 (rex. Civ. App. 1963), vacatedsub nom Dono-
van v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
26. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 375 U.S. 878 (1963). The Court did not grant certiorari,
however, to review the district court's dismissal of the case before it, Id; the dismissal of the
appeal coerced by the state's contempt power, see 377 U.S. at 411 & n.8; or the district court's later
dismissal of petitioners' action to enjoin the Supreme Court of Texas from interfering with the
federal suit, see id
27. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 60:1
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maintained that it was merely following "the old and well-established
judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power
to restrain federal court proceedings in inpersonam actions like the one
here."28 Second, the Court determined that the litigants had a federal
28. Id at 412-13. Justice Black relied upon four cases for this proposition: United States v.
Council of Keokuk, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 514 (1868); Weber v. Lee County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 210
(1868); Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)166 (1868); and M'Kim v. Voohries, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 279 (1812). Although Justice Black did not cite these cases as direct support, his reading
of the precedents has been criticized primarily on the ground that those cases all concerned at-
tempted interference with final federal court orders. Arnold, supra note 3, at 64; Comment, supra
note 3, at 499; see id at 495-96. M'Kun held that "the State Court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a
judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States. ... 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 281. Iggs also
involved a state injunction against the implementation of a federal court order. The Riggs Court,
however, stated:
State courts are exempt from all interference by the Federal tribunals, but they are
destitute of all power to restrain either the process or proceedings in the national courts.
Circuit courts and State courts act separably and independently of each other, and in
their respective spheres of action the process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach
of the other as if the line of division between them "was traced by landmarks and monu-
ments visible to the eye."
Viewed in any light, therefore, it is obvious that the injunction of a State court is
inoperative to control, or in any manner to affect the process or proceedings of a Circuit
court, not on account of any paramount jurisdiction in the latter courts, but because, in
their sphere of action, Circuit courts are wholly independent of the State tribunals.
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 195-96 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,
516 (1859)). Weber was a companion case to Rtggs. Keokuk expressly reaffirmed Riggs. 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) at 517.
Although each of these cases did involve state court interference with final court orders, it is
improper to conclude that, for that reason, they have no application to a situation in which judg-
ment has not been entered in the federal proceeding. As noted, the Riggs opinion expressly de-
nied to state courts the power to restrain the "process or proceedings" of federal courts. 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) at 196. The same is true of Weber, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 213, and Keokuk, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
at 517. Although perhaps written more broadly than necessary, these Supreme Court pronounce-
ments are sufficient to establish the "general rule" to which Justice Black referred in Donovan.
Justice Black also cited M'Kim and Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807), for
the proposition that "[e]arly in the history of our country a general rule was established that state
and federal courts would not interfere with or try to restrain each other's proceedings." 377 U.S.
at 412. Diggs did hold that "a circuit court of the United States had not jurisdiction to enjoin
proceedings in a state court," 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179, but made no mention of reciprocity.
Neither did M'Kim. As is pointed out in Arnold, supra note 3, at 64-65, the better source of such a
rule based upon mutuality of effect is to be found in the writing of Justice Story, upon which the
later cases relied. In his Commentarie on Equity Juriprudence, Justice Story outlined the com-
mon-law power of courts to enjoin inequitable foreign litigation, but continued.
There is one exception to this doctrine which has long been recognized in America; and
that is, that the State Courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the Courts of the United
States; nor the latter in the former courts. This exception proceeds upon peculiar
grounds of municipal and constitutional law, the respective courts being entirely compe-
tent to administer full relief in the suits pending therein.
2 J. STORY, supra note 13, § 900, at 88 (footnote omitted). An excellent analysis of the basis for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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right, in this case pursuant to congressional enactment,29 to have a fed-
eral court adjudicate the issues they presented. Justice Black made no
direct reference in his opinion to the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion,30 but the clause surely was the basis for his statement that "[tihat
right was granted by Congress and cannot be taken away by the
State."3 No credence was given to the argument that because Con-
gress had relaxed the statutory ban on federal injunctions directed at
state court proceedings 32 the judicial prohibition against state injunc-
tions directed at federal proceedings should be correspondingly
relaxed.33
GeneralAtomic Co. v. Feller34 arose as the result of the filing of mul-
this doctrine and its influence on the decisions of the following 70 years may be found in Note,
State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, supra note 3.
29. Justice Black never so stated, but jurisdiction must have been predicated upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976), conferring jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, through the petitioners'
due process claims. See note 16 supra.
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
31. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 413. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S.
12, 15 (1977) (per curiam).
32. See Comment, supra note 3.
The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), unchanged since the 1948 revision, provides: "A court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments."
Early versions of the statute were uncompromising in language. See Judiciary Act of Mar. 2,
1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 ("nor shall a writ of injunction be granted [by a federal court] to stay
proceedings in any court of a state"). Congress later provided an exception in bankruptcy cases.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162. The courts had, however, recognized certain
exceptions prior to the relaxation of the general proscription in 1948, so that other acts of Congress
could be afforded their intended scope. These exceptions included "legislation providing for re-
moval of litigation from state to federal courts ... limiting the liability of shipowners ... pro-
viding for federal interpleader actions,.. . conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages,
... governing federal habeas corpus proceedings and providing for control of prices." Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 234-35 (1972) (footnotes omitted). Accord, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 512 (1974); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-34 (1941).
The Mitchum opinion also noted that three other "implied exceptions" had been recognized:
one for cases in rem, another to prevent relitigation in a state court of issues previously decided in
a federal court, and a third when the United States is a plaintiff in a federal court action and
asserts a superior federal interest. 407 U.S. at 235-36 & nn.18-20. Toucey had "expressly dis-
avowed the 'reitigation' exception to the [anti-injunction] statute," and the congressional response
was the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), which "served not only to overrule the specific
holding of 7oucey, but to restore 'the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to
the Toucey decision."' 407 U.S. at 236 (footnotes omitted) (citing H.R. RE.P No. 308, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., at A181-82 (1947)). See also notes 69-70 infra and accompanying text.
33. 377 U.S. at 412-13. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
34. 434 U.S. 12 (1977).
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tiple lawsuits in state and federal courts among the parties to contracts
providing for the sale of uranium. United Nuclear Corporation (UNC)
had entered into contracts to supply uranium fuel for nuclear reactors
to several utility companies. UNC's assignee subsequently assigned the
contracts to General Atomic Company (GAC). Under a separate
agreement UNC was obligated to supply GAC with the uranium re-
quired to meet the contracts with the utility companies. When the price
of uranium increased from seven dollars per pound to approximately
forty dollars per pound, UNC stopped delivery to GAC and sought a
declaratory judgment in New Mexico state court to avoid its obliga-
tions under the supply contract.3" Shortly thereafter, GAC filed an in-
terpleader action in the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico, naming UNC and four utility companies as defendants.
GAC sought a determination of its rights and obligations under its
agreement with UNC for uranium supplies and under its agreement to
supply the uranium to the utilities. The court dismissed the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the dismissal was affirmed on
appeal.36 Meanwhile, however, three other actions involving GAC and
the utility companies had been instituted in different federal district
courts.
31
UNC obtained an injunction from the New Mexico state court bar-
ring GAC from filing any original, third party, or arbitration actions
against it38 except the two New Mexico federal court actions then in
progress.3 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court, without opinion, de-
35. Id at 12-13. UNC filed this action against GAC and its constituent partners. Upon
removal to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico by one of the partners,
UNC took a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i). On the same day UNC
instituted a new action against only GAC in the New Mexico district court. It did so apparently to
preserve its choice of forum, see General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 13 n.1 (1977), because
GAC was not entitled to remove, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
36. General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 553 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1977). See General
Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 13 & n.2 (1977).
37. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. General Atomic Co., No. 76-881 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1977);
General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 420 F. Supp. 215 (W.D.N.C. 1976); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 400 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Il1. 1975), a 'd, 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1976). See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 13 (1977).
38. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 14 (1977).
39. The actions excepted were the appeals subsequently reported as General Atomic Co. v.
Duke Power Co., 553 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1977), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. United Nuclear Corp., No.
76-032-B (D.N.M. 1976), which was to be dismissed within six months. See General Atomic Co.
v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 14 n.4 (1977); note 49 hyl*a.
Number 1]
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dined to dissolve the injunction.40 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the
New Mexico Supreme Court to determine whether the state court's de-
cision was based on state or federal grounds.41
On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the injunction
was properly issued despite the holding in Donovan.42 It stated that
Donovan was inapplicable to cases in which a party was already litigat-
ing the same issues in federal court, reasoning that the injunction
would not "directly or indirectly affect any proceeding in the district
court or appellate courts of the United States where jurisdiction has
attached." 43 Thus the court distinguished Donovan on the ground that
the injunction in GeneralAtomic was directed toward institution of/fu-
ture litigation, so that no court had yet acquired jurisdiction. 44 Re-
garding GAC's right to a federal forum, the court held:
Here no such right is being infringed. GAC has its case before two
United States Courts--one district court and one appellate. GAC can
raise any issue that is being litigated in the state court, and the federal
court may hear all the questions on the merits; it is not limited to first
considering whether the state decision is valid and the application of res
judicata because no judgment has yet been rendered in the New Mexico
district court. This right the Donovan Court tried to protect and the in-
junction here is not contrary to the Donovan holding.45
The Supreme Court reversed.46 Without hearing argument, the
Court issued a per curiam opinion in which it noted that the injunction
issued by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals had similarly prohibited the
plaintiffs in Donovan from filing further actions in any court.47 The
Court concluded that the New Mexico Supreme Court's attempt to lim-
40. See General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 14 (1977).
41. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 429 U.S. 973 (1976). If the New Mexico Supreme Court's
determination was to rest on an adequate and independent state ground, the Court would have
been without jurisdiction to review. Eg., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Murdock
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 632-33 (1875). See C. Wguorr, FEDERAL COURTS
§ 107 (3d ed. 1976).
42. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 90 N.M. 120, 560 P.2d 541 (1977).
43. Id at 124, 560 P.2d at 545.
44. Id Presumably, this was the basis for excepting the cases already pending in the New
Mexico federal court. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
45. 90 N.M. at 124, 560 P.2d at 545. The court thought that any further federal litigation
would be "vexatious, harassing and multiplicitous." Id at 123, 560 P.2d at 544. Consequently,
the court found the traditional prerequisites to injunctive relief. See note 14 supra.
46. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977).
47. Id at 16-17. See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 410 (1964).
[Vol. 60:1
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it Donovan to anti-suit injunctions against pending, but not impending,
cases was untenable and that the injunction was in "direct conflict with
that decision and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. ' 4  The
Court also rejected the state court's attempt to distinguish Donovan on
the ground that GAC already was proceeding in two federal court ac-
tions49 and that any additional suits would be vexatious and harassing,
because
[D]onovan presented as compelling a case as there could be for permitting
a state court to enjoin the further prosecution of vexatious federal pro-
ceedings.... We nevertheless overturned the state court injunction.
There is even less basis for the injunction in this case. Here there is no
final state court judgment .... [Additionally, w]hat the New Mexico
Supreme Court has described as "harassment" is principally GAC's de-
sire to defend itself by impleading UNC in the federal lawsuits and fed-
eral arbitration proceedings brought against it by the utilities. This, of
course, is something which GAC has every right to attempt to do ....
The right to pursue federal remedies and take advantage of federal proce-
dures and defenses in federal actions may no more be restricted by a state
court here than in Donovan. Federal courts are fully capable of prevent-
ing their misuse for purposes of harassment.50
The dissenters in both Donovan and General'Atomic, while disagree-
ing with the decisions, accepted the analyses employed by the majori-
ties. They were most concerned that the majorities denied "'the
historic power of courts of equity to prevent a misuse of litigation by
enjoining resort to vexatious and oppressive foreign suits.' "51 Justice
Harlan, dissenting in Donovan, was of the opinion that such power did
exist 2.5  He thought the cases cited by Justice Black were not control-
48. 434 U.S. at 15.
49. Indeed, as the Court noted, 434 U.S. at 17 n.10, the federal actions exempted from the
state court's injunction had been dismissed prior to the announcement of the New Mexico
Supreme Court's opinion. See note 39 supra.
50. 434 U.S. at 17-19 (footnotes omitted).
51. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 417 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55 (1911) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). See General
Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 19, 21 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 416-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
cited the dictum to that effect in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1941), and
quoted Justice Story's statement that
[i]t is now held that whenever the parties are resident within a country, the courts of that
country have full authority to act upon them personally with respect to the subject of
suits in a foreign country, as the ends of justice may require; and with that view to order
them to take, or to omit to take, any steps and proceedings in any other court of justice,
whether in the same country, or in any foreign country.
Number 1]
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ling as to the power of a state court to enjoin the prosecution of inequi-
table litigation because they were not concerned with vexatious
litigation. 3 He glossed over, however, the main thesis of the majority
opinion-that the petitioners had a federal right to bring suit in federal
court-stating only that "the statutory boundaries of federal jurisdic-
tion are hardly to be regarded as a license to conduct litigation in the
federal courts for the purpose of harassment. '54
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in GeneralAtomic,55 premised his posi-
tion against the prohibition on the "general rule" against state and fed-
eral court interference with each other. Ironically, this was the same
rule that Justice Black had in part relied upon in Donovan as the basis
for establishing the prohibition. 6 Justice Rehnquist maintained that
this rule of parity implies that because the federal courts are not barred
from enjoining vexatious state court proceedings pursuant to the Anti-
Injunction Act,57 state tribunals should be accorded a like power with
respect to vexatious litigation in a federal forum .5  He then went a step
further:
Congress, in enacting the Anti-Injunction Act limiting the authority of
United States courts to stay proceedings in any court of a State, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283, excepted from the limitation an injunction "where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.". . . If
Congress saw fit to create such an exception to the "[legislative policy
[which] is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition". . . it could not have
intended to deny the same limited injunctive authority to state courts of gen-
eraljurisdiction.59
The dissenters in both cases simply misconceived the nature of the
difficulty. It is true that at common law courts of equity possessed the
power to restrain parties subject to their control from prosecuting ineq-
uitable foreign litigation.6 It is also true that the original judicially
created ban on injunctions against suit in this country applied to both
377 U.S. at 416 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 J. STORY, supra note 13, § 900, at 87).
53. 377 U.S. at 418-21 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 28 supra.
54. 377 U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See note 12 supra.
55. 434 U.S. 12, 20 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 412.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The text of § 2283 is quoted in note 32 supra.
58. 434 U.S. at 20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Black's statement of this general rule is
found in Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 412. See also note 18 SUpra.
59. 434 U.S. at 20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (em-
phasis added).
60. 2 J. STORY, supra note 13, §§ 899-900; Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 828, 829 (1960).
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state and federal courts and was couched in terms of reciprocity.61
Nevertheless, absent congressional sanction, state court interference
with the proceedings of federal courts that are properly seized of both
personal and subject matter jurisdiction is unconstitutional. 62  The
Constitution grants Congress the power to "ordain and establish" lower
federal courts63 and invest them with the "judicial power of the United
States." 6 The states are not free, under the supremacy clause, to inter-
fere with the valid exercise of congressional power.65 Consequently, a
state court may not enjoin federal court proceedings that Congress has
empowered the federal judiciary to hear.
It does not follow, absent specific congressional language to such ef-
fect, that Congress "could not have intended to deny the same limited
injunctive authority to state courts of general jurisdiction '66 when it
enacted the Anti-Injunction Act.67 The purpose of the relevant provi-
sions of that statute was specifically to overrule Toucey v. New York
Life Insurance Co. 61 and to restore "the basic law as generally under-
stood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." 69 7oucey had held
it impermissible for a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding in
61. See note 28 supra. See also, e.g., Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 182 (1884); Amy v.
Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 WalL) 136, 137-38 (1870); Comment, supra note 3, at 495 & n.126; Note,
State Injunctions Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts, supra note 3, at 714 n.5.
62. Justice Black has been criticized for his reliance on the absence of congressional sanction
as a basis for finding a lack of state power. Professor Currie, for example, conceded that "Mr.
Justice Black was quite correct in saying that Congress has never relaxed the rule forbidding state
courts to enjoin federal proceedings," but he asked: "[Slince the courts created the rule to begin
with, what was to stop them from amending it?" D. CuRRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 755 (2d ed. 1975).
The argument, however, fails to recognize that enactment of statutes conferring jurisdiction on the
federal courts, when viewed in light of the supremacy clause, see note 30 supra, operates as just
such a congressional ban on state injunctions. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
63. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. See id art. I, § 8, cL 9.
64. Id art. IlI, § 1. The power of Congress to circumscribe the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts is implied from its power to create those courts under article I and its power to limit
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article III. SeeExparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). See also Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236 (1845).
65. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
66. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 20 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. See note 32 supra.
68. 314 U.S. 118, 137-41 (1941). See note 32supra.
69. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., Ist Sess., at A181-82 (1947). See note 32 supra.
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order to prevent relitigation of a matter originally litigated by the fed-
eral court. The generally understood doctrine prior to 7oucey may
fairly be said to have been that state and federal courts would not inter-
fere with each other's proceedings--except those judicially created ex-
ceptions that Congress preserved by incorporating them into the Anti-
Injunction Act.7"
Nor does it follow, as Justice Harlan suggested, that state injunctions
against federal in personam actions should be allowed simply because
state courts have been permitted to enjoin federal in rem proceedings
over which "statutory [subject matter] jurisdiction"' I existed. Although
federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of an in rem action may
exist, once a state court has exercised prior control over the res in-
volved, the federal courts are deprived of jurisdiction to hear the case-
jurisdiction over the "person," as it were.72
Over a century ago, in Covell v. Heyman,7 3 the Supreme Court recog-
nized the proposition that a court must, of necessity, exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the res in an in rem proceeding in order to avoid dis-
astrous conflicts in the administration of our dual judicial system. Sub-
sequent decisions have faithfully adhered to this proposition.74 The
Covell opinion succinctly set forth the underlying rationale:
The forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered
under a single system, exercise towards each other, whereby conflicts are
avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a prin-
ciple of comity, with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility which
comes from concord; but between State Courts and those of the United
States, it is something more. It is a principle of right and of law, and
therefore, of necessity. It leaves nothing to discretion or mere conven-
ience. These courts do not belong to the same system, so far as their juris-
diction is concurrent; and although they co-exist in the same space, they
are independent and have no common superior. They exercise jurisdic-
70. See notes 28 & 32 supra.
71. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. See D. CuRIm, supra note 62, at 853-54:
It is common understanding that at least three requisites must be satisfied before an
action can be entertained by a federal court. First, there must be jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the case must be a type (e.g., federal-question or diversity) cognizable by
some federal court. Second, there must be jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
or, if the action is in rem, over the property in suit; third, venue must be proper.
Id (emphasis added).
73. 111 U.S. 176 (1884).
74. See, ag., Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida v. Thomp-
son, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1922).
[Vol. 60:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/2
STATE COURT INJUNCTION POWER
tion, it is true, within the same territory, but not in the same plane; and
when one takes into its jurisdiction a specific thing, that res is as much
withdrawn from the judicial power of the other, as if it had been carried
physically into a different territorial sovereignty.75
The factual situation in Princess Lida v. Thompson,76 in which the
Supreme Court first held valid an anti-suit injunction issued by a state
court and directed against a federal adjudication, aptly illustrates the
potential seriousness of such a conflict between state and federal courts.
Princess Lida involved a controversy between two surviving trustees
of a voluntary trust and two of the five beneficiaries. On July 7, 1930,
the two trustees filed a partial accounting with the Court of Common
Pleas of Pennsylvania. The following day the beneficiaries brought suit
against the trustees in federal district court, alleging mismanagement
and praying for an accounting and restitution. The trustees moved for
a dismissal of the federal action, claiming a lack of jurisdiction therein,
and obtained an injunction from the state court barring the cestuis que
trustent from proceeding further in federal court. The federal court
subsequently denied the motion to dismiss and temporarily enjoined
the trustees from further prosecuting the state action for the injunc-
tion77 that the cestuis had appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
On March 21, 1938, nearly eight years after the partial accounting
had been filed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the propriety
of the state injunction.78 On that same day, the federal district court
held that it had jurisdiction over the suit, notwithstanding the prior
control over the res exercised by the state trial court.7 9
Reviewing the affirmance of the state court injunction, the United
States Supreme Court held that the state court had properly enjoined
the cestuis from further proceeding in the federal action:
[I]t is settled that where the judgment sought is strictly in personam, both
the state court and the federal court, having concurrent jurisdiction, may
proceed with the litigation at least until judgment is obtained in one of
them which may be set up as res judicata in the other. On the other hand,
if the two suits are in rem, or quasi in rem, so that the court, or its officer,
has possession or must have control of the property which is the subject of
75. 111 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added).
76. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
77. See id at 460.
78. Thompson v. Fitzgerald, 329 Pa. 497, 198 A. 58 (1938).
79. See 305 U.S. at 460-61.
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the litigation in order to proceed with the cause and grant the relief
sought[,J the jurisdiction of the one court must yield to that of the
other. . . The doctrine is necessary to the harmonious cooperation of
federal and state tribunals.
80
Finding that control of the res was essential to the effective exercise of
the state court's ordinary jurisdiction over the case and that the state
court had first established control over the res, the Court concluded
that the federal district court was "without jurisdiction of the suit sub-
sequently brought for the same relief' and that the petitioners had been
"properly enjoined from further proceedings in that court.""'
It is noteworthy that the permissibility of the state injunction against
federal proceedings in in rem cases depends solely upon the exclusivity
of the state court's jurisdiction. In in personam actions in which there
is concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts, the injunction may
not issue-persuasive equitable arguments to the contrary notwith-
standing. Where a state court has taken prior control over the res, how-
ever, it becomes endowed with exclusive jurisdiction, and the federal
court is deprived of all jurisdiction. When the federal court lacks juris-
diction over subject matter, res, or persons, there is no right to be in
80. Id at 466 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See United States v. Bank of N.Y. &
Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1936); Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195
(1935).
81. 305 U.S. at 468. A federal court first exercising control over a res has the same power to
enjoin conflicting state court proceedings. See, eg., DeKorwin v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 F.2d 337,
340 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 931 (1960); Green v. Green, 259 F.2d 229, 230 (7th Cir.
1958); Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534, 546 (W.D.S.C. 1955); IA
MooRe's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.218[3], at 2522 (2d ed. 1980); C. WRIOHT, supra note 41, § 47, at
201. That power now derives from the "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" language in the
Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), quotedat note 32 supra. See Alabama Vermiculite
Corp. v. Patterson, 149 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.S.C. 1955); C. WmoiHr, supra note 41, § 47, at 204.
The Supreme Court, however, had allowed such an injunction prior to the 1948 relaxation of the
anti-injunction statute, basing its power on the same theory:
It is settled that where a federal court has first acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter
of a cause, it may enjoin the parties from proceeding in a state court of concurrent juris-
diction where the effect of the action would be to defeat or impair the jurisdiction of the
federal court. Where the action is in rem the effect is to draw to the federal court the
possession or control, actual or potential, of the res, and the exercise by the state court of
jurisdiction over the same res necessarily impairs and may defeat, the jurisdiction of the
federal court already attached. The converse of the rule is equally true, that where the
jurisdiction of the state court has first attached, the federal court is precluded from exer-
cising its jurisdiction over the same res to defeat or impair the state court's jurisdiction.
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922). Federal courts also have the power to
protect their prior in rem jurisdiction from interference by other federal courts. See, e.g., Al-
buqerque Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 212 F.2d 943, 949 (5th Cir. 1954); IA MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra, 11 0.214, at 2507; 0.21813], at 2522.
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federal court.82 A state injunction may then issue, not because the in
rem situation is special but because the rule in Donovan will not have
been violated.
The same is true in in personam actions in which the federal court is
barred from taking cognizance of the suit by mandate of Congress or
the Constitution. In those situations, too, a state court, as long as it
possesses jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, should have
the power to protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the unauthorized fed-
eral proceedings-assuming that the traditional equitable prerequisites
for the issuance of an injunction also exist."3 The holdings in Donovan
and GeneralAtomic were premised upon the litigants' congressionally
granted right to a federal forum-a right, the Court held, that "cannot
be taken away by a State."84 In Donovan the petitioners were adjudged
to have been "properly in the federal court."85 In GeneralAtomic the
state court injunction prohibited the petitioners from either impleading
UNC in federal court lawsuits already in progress or instituting new
federal litigation.86 In regard to the former prohibition the Court held
that petitioners had a "right to pursue federal remedies and take ad-
vantage of federal procedures and defenses,"87 a right obviously ancil-
lary to that of proceeding in a federal forum.88
In regard to the prohibition against instituting new federal proceed-
ings, the Court in GeneralAtomic merely held that Donovan controlled
because the state court injunction there had included a like prohibi-
tion.89 In Donovan, however, the litigants' right regarding prospective
litigation was easily determinable, because the state court injunction
prohibited the institution of new federal proceedings between the same
parties and over the same subject matter as in the federal court suit
then pending.90 In other words, the injunction prohibited instituting
82. See note 72 supra.
83. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
84. General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 16 (1977); Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408, 413 (1964).
85. 377 U.S. at 413.
86. 434 U.S. at 14 n.4. See notes 39-49 supra.
87. 434 U.S. at 18-19.
88. See Hornstein, Federalism, JudicialPower andthe ' 4nring Under"Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts: A Hierarchical.1nalysis, 56 IND. LJ. 563 (1981).
89. 434 U.S. at 16-17. See 377 U.S. at 410-11; City of Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W.2d 240, 241
(Tex. Civ. App. 1963), vacated sub. nom Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
90. 377 U.S. at 410. The injunction was directed to Donovan, et al, respondents, and, in
pertinent part, prohibited them from
filing or instituting any litigation... seeking to contest the right of the City of Dallas to
proceed with the construction of the parallel runway as presently proposed at Love Field
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suits of which it had been determined that federal courts could take
cognizance and that, therefore, the parties had a federal right to pursue.
In GeneralAtomic, the injunction was not against the institution of
new federal litigation identical to any pending federal action. 91 No de-
termination, therefore, had yet been made with respect to whether the
parties possessed a federal right to a federal forum for prospective suits.
The Court's reliance on its earlier decision in Donovan thus was inap-
propriate, because Donovan only prohibited the deprivation of a right
previously determined to exist. As a result, the Court in General
Atomic, without so acknowledging, extended Donovan to its logical
(and still officially unstated) conclusion: a litigant may not be deprived
of his right to a federal forum unless and until that right is determined
not to exist. After GeneralAtomic, therefore, the burden is on the party
claiming lack of federal judicial power. Because that party will be the
plaintiff in the state proceeding for the injunction, it should be expected
that he is to bear that burden.
Consequently one may read both Donovan and GeneralAtomic as
prohibiting only state court injunctions against in personam federal
court actions over which the federal court has jurisdiction. The con-
verse is implicit: state courts are not so prohibited if federal jurisdic-
tion is absent. Thus, determining the appropriate forum for deciding
the existence vel non of federal jurisdiction is critical to the question of
the propriety of state injunctions against federal proceedings.
III. STATE COURT POWER TO DETERMINE FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The notion that a state court might properly determine the existence
or, more precisely, the nonexistence of federal jurisdiction may appear
... or from instituting and prosecuting any further litigation... the purpose of which
is to contest the validity of the airport revenue bonds ... that might be issued... for
the construction of the Love Field runway ....
City of Dallas v. Brown, 368 S.W.2d 240,242 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963), vacated sub nont. Donovan v.
City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). The City of Dallas, of course, would have to be a necessary
party defendant to any such litigation.
91. See 434 U.S. at 14 n.4. The interpleader action filed by GAC against UNC and four
utility companies had been dismissed on March 2, 1976, a month before the state court injunction
issued. See id at 13. That action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 553 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1977). The only other action
pending between GAC and UNC at the time was the second declaratory judgment action filed by
UNC in the Santa Fe district court. UNC had taken a voluntary nonsuit when the first such
action was removed to federal court. See 434 U.S. at 13 n.1.
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novel and unsupported by precedent. Yet in the in rem situation that is
precisely what occurs." The state court must determine that its juris-
diction is exclusive-that is, that the federal court is without jurisdic-
tion over the res-before it may enjoin duplicative federal
proceedings.93
It is but a short analytical step from the in rem situation in which a
state court may determine that the federal court has no jurisdiction
over the "thing," or res, to its in personam analog: the determination
by a state court that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the cause or the person of the defendant.94
Congress undoubtedly has the power to provide that the jurisdiction
of the federal courts shall be exclusive of the courts of the several
states,9 but Congress must do so "expressly or by fair implication." 96
The Supreme Court has, for over a century, regarded exclusive federal
jurisdiction as the exception, not the rule: concurrent state-federal ju-
risdiction exists unless "excluded by express [statutory] provision, or by
incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular
case." 97 Congress apparently has never spoken with respect to the ex-
clusive right of federal courts to determine federal jurisdiction.98 The
92. See notes 72-82 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).
94. For the sake of concision the following discussion is in terms of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. It is, however, equally applicable to the question of jurisdiction over the person. If the
analysis is valid for the former, it is valid for the latter. Indeed, in many cases the competence of a
state court to decide whether a federal court lacks jurisdiction over the person is easier to assert
than when the problem involves federal subject matter jurisdiction, for in the former case the
governing law is often the law of the state. FED. R. Clv. P. 4(d)(2), (3), (6), (7). Cf. Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (state law rather than Rule 3 determined when action
commenced for state statute of limitations purposes).
95. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429 (1867); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816); THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 516 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.
1961).
96. E.g., 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3527, at 120-21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 41,
§ 10, at 26.
97. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876). Accord, Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962); D. CURRIE, supra note 62, at 374; FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 96, § 3527, at 124. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 41, § 10, at 26.
98. The legislative purview is, of course, much broader than that of the judiciary. See gener-
ally 70 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1957). The task of the courts is to decide whether the congressional
grant of federal jurisdiction is to be interpreted as a grant of the exclusive power to determine that
jurisdiction. The touchstone of that determination is the existence velnon of no legal "incompati-
bility" between state and federal courts acting concurrently in this area. Should the need arise for
congressional examination of this question, there are extra-legal factors that will also require con-
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question to be examined here, therefore, is whether the exercise of con-
current jurisdiction over that issue is incompatible with the efficient op-
eration of our dual judicial system.
It is hornbook law that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdic-
tion and that most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. 99 As
such, state courts have the power,"°° and indeed the duty, 0 1 to con-
strue, apply (or limit the application) and even declare unconstitutional
laws of the United States."°2 The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained a
provision establishing Supreme Court review of state court decisions
"where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of...
the United States, and the decision is against their validity."'1 3 That
provision survives. 1°4 In 1816, the Supreme Court recognized this
sideration. These factors fall generally into three categories: (I) administration of the law; (2) ju-
dicial economy; and (3) comity. This last category includes but a single factor for consideration:
the likelihood that the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction will generate state-federal friction. Each
of the first two categories includes several factors that should be weighed.
Within the category labeled administration of the law fall the national policy factors. One
justification for exclusive federal jurisdiction in certain areas of the law is a need for uniformity of
decision. This factor should certainly be considered here, but it may be noted that there is often
uniformity within the federal system only when the Supreme Court has spoken unequivocally and
that state courts are also bound by Supreme Court rulings on federal law. Another factor is the
likelihood that errors will be frequent or serious. A third is whether there is an overriding na-
tional concern militating either for or against the normal state-federal concurrent jurisdiction over
federal law.
Within the category labeled judicial economy are more pragmatic questions. Is there, for exam-
ple, a greater familiarity with the law on one side, and should that outweigh a greater familiarity
with the particular case on the other. Is there a significant saving of time and judicial resources if
a state court judge who has the case already before him makes the jurisdictional determination?
99. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 41, § 7, at 17.
100. Ihe State courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further
than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion that in every case in which they
were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of
course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.
Tim FEDERALIsT No. 82, supra note 95, at 516. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S.
502 (1962); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
101. The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws is
no reason why it should not afford relief [under federal law]; because it is subject also to
the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative
within the State as it is to recognize the State laws.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1879). Accord, Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947);
McKnott v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223
U.S. 1 (1912).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). See notes 105-07 infra and accompanying text.
103. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 StaL 73.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) states in part that
[final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
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power in the famous case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.'0 5 Justice Story,
writing for the Court, reversed a decision of the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals"° that had found section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 uncon-
stitutional. Justice Story did not, however, reverse upon the ground
that the Virginia court was inherently incapable of invalidating a con-
gressional enactment. Rather, he held section 25 to be necessary if the
judicial power of the United States was to extend to all cases arising
under federal law, because state courts were certain to be called upon
to adjudicate federal questions.10 7
Given that the interpretation and application of federal law by state
courts is generally compatible with (and, indeed, necessary to) the effi-
cient operation of our dual judicial system, it remains only to deter-
mine whether state courts should for any reason be relieved of that
responsibility with respect to the statutes establishing the jurisdictional
limitations of the federal courts. The most compelling argument in
favor of regarding jurisdiction to determine federal jurisdiction as re-
served exclusively for the federal judiciary is that state courts otherwise
would exercise a large measure of control over federal courts--control
that might violate the supremacy clause.
Article III of the Constitution generally defines the boundaries of
federal jurisdiction. Congress, acting in accordance with the article, 10 8
specifically delineates and vests this jurisdiction in the federal courts.
The inferior federal courts are incapable of taking cognizance of any
suit that falls beyond the limits so prescribed and must in each case
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
105. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
106. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1813).
107. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 339.
108. The Supreme Court has stated that
the judicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is
(except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to this court) dependent for its
distribution and organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action
of Congress, who possesses the sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the
Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with juris-
diction ....
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Accord, Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
400-02 (1973); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226,233-34 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 328-31
(1816); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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determine, upon their own motion if necessary,10 9 whether Congress
and the Constitution authorize the proceedings."1 0 That determination
is a process controlled by constitutional and congressional mandate.
The lower federal courts have no discretion to expand' and little dis-
cretion to contract the jurisdiction so authorized."I2 All jurisdictional
determinations, of course, ultimately are subject to review by the
Supreme Court."1
3
State courts possess the competence to apply and interpret the laws
of the United States and have a duty so to do when resolution of a case
before them so requires. That in a given case a law happens to confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts should not disturb the general state
court competence unless its interpretation or application gives the state
court an unwarranted control over the operations of the federal courts.
The Constitution, however, allows, as the inevitable price of a concur-
rent jurisdiction, whatever "control" results from interpretation and ap-
plication of a statute passed by Congress. Misinterpretation or
misapplication, whether intentional or unintentional, may be corrected
upon review by the Supreme Court-as are errors made with respect to
any other federal law by state or lower federal courts.
Thus the exercise of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction in this area
is not incompatible with the operation of our dual judicial system. Nor
is the supremacy clause in any way violated. A state tribunal, making a
federal jurisdictional determination incident to its decision regarding
issuance of an injunction against a federal court suit, would be follow-
ing both the letter and the spirit of that clause. It would be according
the proper respect to superior federal law in the course of determining
its proper action under state law.
109. E.g., Mansfield, C. & L.M.R.R. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Warner v. Territory of
Hawaii, 206 F.2d 851, 852 (9th Cir. 1953).
110. See C. WiGrrr, .uspra note 41, § 7, at 17.
111. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441 (1850); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
112. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821), in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated.
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally
true that it must take jurisdiction if it should .... We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
But see Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (dictum); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315, 317 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941); Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (dictum); C. WIuGHT, supra note 41, § 52.
113. See 28 U.S.C. f§ 1254, 1258 (1976). Clearly, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States is a federal question.
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Upon establishing that federal court jurisdiction is lacking and that
traditional equitable prerequisites have been met,' 14 a state court may
properly enjoin the parties to a suit before it from proceeding in federal
court. This raises the issue of what effect such an injunction should
have in the event an action is filed in a federal court in violation of the
state court order.
IV. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF STATE DETERMINATIONS OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Although the propriety of an injunction against suit does not turn
upon whether it is directed to the parties or to the court that would
have conducted the proceedings enjoined, the anti-suit injunction nor-
mally speaks to the parties rather than to the court.11 5 Consequently,
when a state court issues an injunction against engaging in pending or
impending federal litigation, the parties so restrained must either com-
ply or risk contempt proceedings. Should the parties choose to obey
the state court order-forsaking filing a contemplated action or aban-
doning a previously instituted one-the federal court will be affected
only indirectly. Should the parties choose to defy the state court's in-
junction, however, the federal court in which suit is initiated will be
required to determine the effect of the prior state adjudication on its
own jurisdiction. 6
Federal courts are required, as a matter of federal law, to give some
preclusive effect to prior state court adjudication.1 7 Although the de-
tails of the requirement remain unclear,"1 it can be said that before an
issue decided in a former case is given preclusive effect, certain general
114. See note 14 supra.
115. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287
(1970) (federal injunction).
116. Defiance may also result in a state contempt citation that may in turn lead to eventual
federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Although resjudicata is not applicable to
federal post-conviction review, it is unlikely that the federal district court on a writ of habeas
corpus would determine the correctness of the state court's determination of federal jurisdiction.
See generally United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
117. The law of preclusion has two aspects: res judicata or claim preclusion, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45(a)-(b) (rent. Draft No. 1, 1973), and collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion, Id § 45(c). Res judicata precludes a party from asserting the same claim or
defense that was or could have been asserted in the prior litigation. Id §§ 47, 48, 56, & 56.1.
Under collateral estoppel any issue actually determined by the prior judgment is foreclosed. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
118. See notes 134-94 infra and accompanying text.
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prerequisites must be established: there must be a final judgment;," 9
the parties in the subsequent federal action must be the same, or there
must be reason to treat them as the same, as those in the former state
action;' 20 the issue must be the same;' 2' and, most important, the issue
must actually have been litigated in the former proceedings' 22 and
must have been necessary to the earlier judicial determination.' 23
The Supreme Court has indicated that preclusive effect must be
given to the judgment of a court having personal and subject matter
jurisdiction.124 Although such effect need not be given when jurisdic-
tion is lacking,' 25 if the first court has examined the question of its own
jurisdiction, its determination is binding in a subsequent proceeding 26
on the theory that regardless of its jurisdiction to determine the case,
the state court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.
The question presented here is whether a state court's determination
of its own jurisdiction, which necessarily entails a corresponding deter-
mination that a federal court lacks jurisdiction, must be given preclu-
sive effect in a subsequent federal proceeding. Another way of putting
the question is whether, given the important federal values involved, a
federal court should be bound to follow a state court's determination
that denies the power of the federal court. Although this inquiry is
related to the question of state court power to determine initially the
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 41, 68 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
120. The parties need not be identical. The trend is to hold prior judgments preclusive when-
ever the party to be precluded had an opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. See,
eg., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDO-
MENTS § 11, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 4, April 15, 1977). Cf. County of Imperial v. Munoz,
449 U.S. 54, 59-60 (1980) (federal injunction barred by Anti-Injunction Act unless sought by
strangers who were not bound "'as though [they were parties] to the litigation in the state
court' ").
121. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1977).
122. E.g., id § 68. See id, comments c, d, & e. It is noteworthy that the question of federal
jurisdiction was not litigated in the prior state proceedings in either Donovan or G4C.
123. Id Comments h, i, &j.
124. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942).
125. See, eg., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (court must be one of "com-
potent jurisdiction"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977)
(same).
126. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 43 (1938) (subject matter jurisdiction); American Sur. Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1932) (personal jurisdiction). Accord, Jack's Fruit Co. v. Growers
Marketing Serv., Inc., 488 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S.
165, 173 (1938).
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jurisdiction of the federal court, 127 the issue may be of yet greater sig-
nificance because it may deny ultimate federal power, other than that
of the Supreme Court, 2 ' to make or review that determination. 29 A
danger may be perceived that if states are permitted to prevent the ex-
ercise of federal protection through the preclusive effect of their own
courts' judgments, then the principle of federal protection will be
thwarted. Yet the general requirements of preclusion will have been
met: there will have been a final adjudication in an action between the
same parties of an issue actually and necessarily litigated. Only if the
nature of that issue warrants a departure from the general criteria of
preclusion should the state determination not be binding. This inquiry
may in turn depend upon the source of law that controls the specific
requirements of preclusion. If the law of the judgment state supplies
the rule of decision with respect to the effect of its judgments, a federal
court will not be free in the same way as if the rule of decision is sup-
plied by a federal common law of preclusion.
Although federal courts are required to give preclusive effect to prior
state court judgments, the source of the requirement and the content of
the law to be applied are less than entirely clear.130 The prevailing
view is that Congress has commanded that the law to be applied is that
of the state whose court has rendered the judgment.13 Cases have sug-
gested, however, that the rule of decision to be applied in determining
the effect of a prior state court judgment stems from the same source as
the rule to be applied when the prior judgment is federal.132 Under this
theory the effect of a prior state court judgment would be determined
by resort to federal common law, the content of which need not be
127. See text accompanying notes 92-114 supra.
128. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 116 supra.
130. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment. The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. REv. 1723, 1726-28 (1968).
131. Eg., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1978); 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
mpra note 81, 1 0.46[ 1 ]; Currie, Res Judicaita. The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 326
(1978).
The relevant statute provides: "[Jiudicial proceedings of any court of any... state... shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States... as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). "[Court within the United States"
includes federal courts. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, applies only to the
states.
132. Eg., Jones v. United States, 228 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Williamson v. Columbia Gas
& Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
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bounded by the law of the judgment state.133
Additionally, it may be that the doctrine of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins 34 dictates the application of neither federal common law
nor the law of the judgment state but, rather, the law of the state in
which the federal court sits. This approach now appears to represent
the prevailing view.' 35 Because the statute 136 and the Constitution 137
require the state courts to apply the law of the judgment state to the
question of the judgment's preclusive effect, one might expect that it
would be immaterial whether the federal court in a diversity case
sought to apply the law of the judgment state or the law of the state in
which the federal court sits-which itself is required to look to the law
of the judgment state. Yet in the latter instance, the federal court
would look to the forum state's view of the judgment state's preclusion
law, while in the former case it would look directly to the judgment
state's view of its own law.
If either the law of the forum state or the law of the rendering state is
to determine the preclusive effect of a prior determination that the fed-
eral court lacks jurisdiction, the analysis is concluded. The federal in-
terest involved in that inquiry, however, likely would justify resort to
federal common law in order to determine the preclusive effect to be
given the prior state adjudication. Consequently, it is necessary to de-
termine the content of the federal preclusion doctrine.
In three recent opinions the Supreme Court has addressed the ques-
tion of the proper effect that a federal court should give to determina-
tion by a state court of matters of federal concern. Although the
analyses of both the source of law question and the content of the ap-
plicable law of preclusion are less than satisfactory, the opinions none-
theless suggest a theory of preclusion to accommodate the state and
federal interests involved.
In Brown v. Felsen 38 the Court permitted litigation in federal court
of a question concerning the dischargeability of a debt that a state court
had previously determined to be due. In Montana v. United States139
133. Vestal, supra note 130, at 1726-28, 1749-50.
134. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
135. See Degnan, FederalizedRes Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 750, 753 (1976); Vestal, supra
note 130, at 1728-33.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
137. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
138. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
139. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
[Vol. 60:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/2
STATE COURT INJUNCTION POWER
the Court held that the federal government could not relitigate in fed-
eral court issues previously determined in a state action in which the
federal government had financed and controlled the litigation. Finally,
in Allen v. McCurry 1 the Court applied collateral estoppel to a suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite the unavailability of a federal
forum for consideration of plaintiffs claim.
In Brown v. Fe/sen a debt had been reduced to judgment in state
court prior to the debtor's bankruptcy petition. A debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy leaves unaffected debts that are the product of the debtor's
fraud or deceit.1 41 The state judgment was the result of a stipulation
that did not indicate the basis of the creditor's claim or of the debtor's
liability. 142 In the bankruptcy court, the creditor contended that the
debt was not dischargeable because it was the product of the debtor's
fraud and deceit. The debtor's position was that the state judgment in
favor of the creditor and the record on which that judgment was based
(including the stipulation) did not reflect any such finding and that the
creditor was barred by res judicata from relitigating the question of
fraud. 143
The Court held that res judicata did not bar consideration of the
creditor's claim that the debt was based on fraud. First, the defense of
bankruptcy was itself new matter that upset the repose of the prior
judgment in the creditor's favor. Hence, the creditor was entitled to the
opportunity to meet this "new initiative.'" 144 More important, the 1970
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act were found to reflect a congres-
sional purpose to have the bankruptcy court determine dischargeability
questions under section 17a rather than to have those questions deter-
mined in state court collection suits, as had been the pattern before the
amendments.145 The Court reasoned that it would make little sense to
compel a creditor in the state collection proceeding to litigate issues
irrelevant to those proceedings but material to discharge in order to
avoid the "mere possibility that a debtor might take bankruptcy in the
140. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976). Brown involved the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was repealed
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (codified at lI
U.S.C. § 101 prec. note (Supp. IV 1980)). The new statute however, contains similar discharge
provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. IV 1980). See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 129 n.1 (1979).
142. 442 U.S. at 128.
143. Id at 129.
144. Id at 134.
145. Id at 135-36.
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future." 146
The Court went still further, stating that even an express state court
ruling on such issues would not be entitled to preclusive effect. Con-
gress intended the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to be exclusive
with respect to such issues, the Court stated, and this intention would
be frustrated by the application of res judicata. 147
Several aspects of the case are noteworthy. First, although the Court
failed to indicate how it derived the res judicata principles it applied,
the source most likely was the federal common law of preclusion.1 48
The law of the state rendering the initial consent judgment apparently
would have applied res judicata to bar additional evidence on the dis-
chargeability question. 149 The Court, however, gave this no greater
weight than it did the positions of a number of other state and federal
courts and several commentators. 150
Second, the Court made much of the expertise of the bankruptcy
court, the strength of the federal interest in determinations of dischar-
gability, and Congress' desire to vest the bankruptcy court with the ex-
clusive power to determine such issues.151 Consequently, there appears
to be an as yet undefined relationship between the exclusivity of federal
jurisdiction and the application vel non of res judicata. Courts and
commentators elsewhere have suggested such a relationship,152 al-
though it still represents a minority view. 5 3 Even if the Court ulti-
mately adumbrates this relationship, it is important to recall that
federal jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is not exclusive. The state
courts, too, are competent to decide questions of federal law having to
do with jurisdiction. 1 4
Finally, the Court was careful to note that the issue was res judicata
and thus avoided applying "the narrower principle of collateral estop-
146. Id at 135.
147. Id at 135-36.
148. See notes 132-33 supra and accompanying text.
149. Miller v. Rush, 155 Colo. 178, 187-88, 393 P.2d 565, 571 (1964).
150. 442 U.S. at 133-34 n.6.
151. Id at 134-36.
152. E.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 350 U.S. 825
(1955); Currie, supra note 131, at 347-48; Note, Res Juicata: Exclusive FederalJurisdction and the
Effect ofPrior State Court Judgments, 53 VA. L. Rnv. 1360 (1967). Contra, IB MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE, supra note 81, 0.445.
153. Currie, supra note 131, at 347 n.203.
154. See text accompanying notes 92-114 supra.
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pel.'" The question of fraud sought to be litigated in the bankruptcy
court had not been actually and necessarily decided in the prior state
suit. Thus, the Court reserved the question of the appropriate preclu-
sive effect to be given a state judgment that had actually and necessar-
ily decided the question sought to be relitigated in the federal forum.
156
Again, it is worth recalling that a state court, in order to enjoin pro-
ceedings in a federal court, must first actually and necessarily deter-
mine that federal jurisdiction is absent.
In Montana v. United States 17 the Supreme Court was called upon
to determine the preclusive effect of a state court determination of a
question that had been actually and necessarily decided in the prior
suit. Montana imposed a gross receipts tax on contractors of public,
but not private, construction contracts. A federal contractor challenged
the tax in state court at the instance of the United States, which di-
rected and financed the litigation.5 8 The theory of the suit was that the
tax violated the supremacy clause by singling out the federal govern-
ment and those with whom it dealt for disparate treatment. Private
contractors were not subject to the tax, and state contractors, through
higher prices, passed the extra cost back to the state, which had im-
posed the tax. Federal contractors, however, would pass the cost on to
the federal government, which could not recoup it through offsetting
revenues as did the state through collection of the tax.5 9 The Montana
Supreme Court sustained the tax.1"
Shortly after initiation of the state action, the government filed suit
in federal court which was then continued by agreement pending deci-
sion by the state courts. The federal court subsequently held the tax
invalid under the supremacy clause. The federal court found that res
judicata was not a bar to the government's suit.' 6' The Supreme Court
155. 442 U.S. at 139 n.10. See Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1978).
156. 442 U.S. at 139 n.10.
157. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
158. Id at 151.
159. Id at 152.
160. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 161 Mont. 140, 505 P.2d 102 (1973).
See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 151 (1979). A second suit was filed by the contractor,
again at the behest of the Government, for tax payments alleged to be different from those in the
first suit. The Montana Supreme Court found them to be essentially the same and dismissed the
action on the ground of res judicata. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Department of Revenue, 166
Mont. 260, 531 P.2d 1327 (1975). See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. at 151.
161. United States v. Montana, 437 F. Supp. 354 (D. Mont. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
See United States v. Montana, 440 U.S. at 151-52.
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reversed, holding that the government, because it had controlled the
state litigation, was bound by the prior adverse determination. 162 The
Court relied on general principles of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel, citing general works, federal cases, and even a state case. The
opinion neither contained a reference to constitutional or statutory full
faith and credit nor discussed the source of its law of preclusion. Ap-
parently, the Court adopted a general common law of preclusion as
federal common law.
The Court concluded that the government was so involved in the
prior state litigation that it should be precluded under the rule that
nonparties who control litigation in which they have a direct financial
interest are precluded from relitigating the issue. 63 The Court also
found that the issue litigated was the same 64 and that there had been
no change in the facts or legal principles since the state judgment.161
Finally, it determined that nothing in the particular circumstances jus-
tified an exception to preclusion. 166
The Court considered three circumstances that might have war-
ranted finding such an exception but found none of them present.
These circumstances are also absent in the case in which a state court
has enjoined federal litigation in part on the basis of a finding that the
federal court is without jurisdiction. First, the Court noted an excep-
tion to the general principles of preclusion for "'unmixed questions of
law' in successive actions involving substantially unrelated claims."'1 67
Because of the congruence in the subject matter of the state and federal
suits, this exception was inapplicable in Montana v. United States.
There is similar congruence when a federal court is asked to second-
guess a state court's determination that Congress has not vested the
federal courts with jurisdiction over a particular case.
Second, the case did not involve "a litigant who ha[d] 'properly in-
voked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal
constitutional claims' and who [was] then 'compelled, without his con-
sent. . . , to accept a state court's determination of those claims.' ,,168
162. 440 U.S. at 153-55.
163. Id. See also County of Imperial v. Munoz, 449 U.S. 54 (1980).
164. 440 U.S. at 156-58.
165. Id at 158-62.
166. Id at 162-64.
167. Id at 162 (quoting United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)).
168. 440 U.S. at 163 (quoting England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
415 (1964)).
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Although the government had filed suit in federal court shortly after
commencement of the state action, the federal suit had been continued
by agreement pending the state court decision.1 69 Consequently, if a
litigant voluntarily foregoes federal adjudication, or if the litigant does
not have a right to a federal forum, this basis for an exception to the
principles of preclusion becomes inapplicable. Moreover, when a state
court enjoins parties before it from commencing federal litigation on
the ground that federal jurisdiction is lacking there will not even have
been a prior invocation of federal jurisdiction. If federal judicial power
had been successfully invoked before filing of the state court suit to
enjoin, the federal court's determination of its own jurisdiction would
preclude the state court from finding such jurisdiction lacking. 170 It is
only when the party resisting the state injunction has not "properly in-
voked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court" that the state injunc-
tion would be permissible.
Finally, there was no allegation that the state procedure was unfair
or inadequate. Given a full and fair opportunity to present the federal
issues before a state court competent to decide them, redetermination
of those issues would be unwarranted. 171 Similarly, when the party re-
sisting the anti-suit injunction has had a full and fair opportunity to
establish his alleged right to litigate in federal court and has failed,
there is no basis on which to provide a second opportunity to do so, and
any exception to the policies of repose and finality reflected in the pre-
clusion doctrine is unwarranted. The state court is fully competent to
determine the federal question and, if there is no reason to doubt the
quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the state procedures, the prior de-
termination is entitled to full faith and credit.1 72
It is this notion that provided the basis for the Court's most recent
pronouncement on the preclusive effect that a federal court is required
to give a prior state court's determination of federal law. Allen v. Mc-
Curry 173 was a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages
for an alleged unconstitutional entry into a home and subsequent
seizure of evidence. Prior to the section 1983 action, McCurry had
been convicted in state court after his motion to suppress the evidence
169. 440 U.S. at 151.
170. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
171. 440 U.S. at 163-64.
172. Id at 164.
173. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
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in question had been denied. 74 The federal district court held Mc-
Curry's section 1983 claim precluded by the prior decision of the state
court denying his motion to suppress and upholding the constitutional-
ity of the entry.'75 The Court of Appeals reversed.17 6 Without going so
far as to hold all section 1983 cases an exception to the doctrine of
preclusion, the Eighth Circuit held that the unavailability of federal
habeas corpus to challenge convictions based on unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence'77 warranted such an exception for cases such as Mc-
Curry's. The court reasoned that the federal courts' "special role"'178 in
the protection of civil rights could not be vindicated if such claims were
precluded. 79 The Supreme Court reversed.'80
The Court noted that the congressional command of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738181 required federal courts to give the same effect to a state court
judgment as would the rendering state. Rather than regarding it as a
device for terminating the inquiry, however, the Court viewed the stat-
ute as part of the "background" against which the relationship of sec-
tion 1983 and collateral estoppel were to be examined. 82 The full faith
and credit statute did not foreclose the question whether the rules of
preclusion were applicable in section 1983 actions. That question was
to be determined in light of the purposes of section 1983 and the princi-
ples of comity and federalism.'83 Moreover, the Court expressly re-
served the question of the scope or content of the preclusion doctrine
under the common law or section 1738. 84 Consequently, the opinion
failed to resolve many questions that bear upon the issue of the preclu-
sive effect a federal court is to give a prior determination by a state
court.
174. See id at 92. The state court had granted the motion to suppress with respect to some of
the evidence seized but upheld the entry and the seizure of evidence in plain view subsequent to
the entry. State v. McCurry, 587 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). See 449 U.S. at 93 n.2.
175. McCurry v. Allen, 466 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mo. 1978), revd, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See 449 U.S. at 92-93.
176. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See 449 U.S. at
93.
177. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
178. 606 F.2d at 799.
179. Id See 449 U.S. at 93-94.
180. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
181. See note 131 supra.
182. 449 U.S. at 96.
183. Id
184. Id at 93 n.2, 105 n.25.
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Nonetheless, the opinion does illuminate that issue. Because of the
special nature of section 1983, one would expect the preclusion doctrine
to apply with no greater strictness in these cases than in others. More-
over, a party situated similarly to the defendant in McCurry, whose
only opportunity to obtain a federal determination of his claims (apart
from Supreme Court review of his state criminal conviction) would be
foreclosed by giving preclusive effect to the state court's determination
of the federal claim, might expect a still less strict approach to the ap-
plication of the law of preclusion. Thus, by holding the preclusion doc-
trine applicable in section 1983 cases for alleged violations of federal
rights for which no other federal remedy is available, the Court must be
seen as taking a very hard line.
Finally, it is noteworthy that McCurry did not freely and voluntarily
submit his claims to the state tribunal.185 Unlike Montana v. United
States, in which the government submitted to a state court18 6 claims
that were identical to those involved in the federal litigation, McCurry
was compelled by the state criminal proceeding against him to litigate
his claim of unconstitutional search in the state court. 87 Nonetheless,
because he had already fully and fairly litigated his claim in state court,
the preclusion doctrine barred relitigation in federal court.'8
These three cases help to clarify the application of the doctrine of
preclusion to be applied by a federal court when the issue before it
previously has been before a state court. In general, though, it remains
unclear what effect is to be given to issues that might have been, but
were not actually, litigated in the state proceedings. 189 In cases in
which the emergence of the federal issue might have been premature,
so that the motivation to litigate might have been half-hearted, it may
be that a federal court need not give preclusive effect to the state pro-
ceeding.' 9° It seems plain, however, that when the parties have had a
full and fair hearing on an issue of federal law before a state tribunal,
185. See 449 U.S. at 101 n.17. See also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964).
186. 440 U.S. 147 (1979). See notes 162-63 supra and accompanying text.
187. See 449 U.S. at 104 n.23.
188. Whether the doctrine would apply to bar reitigation of a federal issue that could have
been, but was not, raised in a prior state proceeding, see Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir.
1977); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Mack v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry,
430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), was a question expressly reserved by the Court. 449 U.S. at 97 n.10.
189. See, ag., 449 U.S. at 94 n.5, 97 n.10.
190. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135 (1979). See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
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whether both parties had sought the adjudication or one was compelled
to appear, a federal court must give preclusive effect to the prior state
court determination. 91 This is true even when the federal government
itself is the party seeking to vindicate an alleged federal interest in its
own courts 92 or when the issue to be litigated is one over which the
federal courts traditionally have demonstrated great sympathy and
hospitality.193
The preceding seems to be true in all cases in which a state court has
actually determined, after a full and fair hearing, an issue of federal
law that a party seeks to relitigate in federal court. There is, however,
one exception: relitigation is permissible in those cases in which Con-
gress has manifested the intention that the federal forum be empow-
ered to determine a particular issue, notwithstanding any prior
determination by a state court. As the Court noted in Allen v. Mc-
Curry, the basis for finding a right to litigate a federal claim in a fed-
eral district court is "distrust of the capacity of the state courts to render
correct decisions. ... 194 The Court has made clear, however, that
such distrust is an unwarranted breach of the principles of federalism
which define the relationship of the state and federal courts.1 95 It is
191. The Third Circuit, in a related context, has read Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974), to permit federal reitigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333
(3d Cir. 1980). More recently, the Third Circuit has allowed federal relitigation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Davis v. United States Steel Co., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 727 (3d Cir. 1981). Alexander,
however, found merely that a Title VII plaintiff was not barred by an adverse arbitration decision,
rendered pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, from adjudicating his claim in a federal
judicial forum. 415 U.S. at 49. In both Smouse and Davis, on the other hand, the plaintiff's claim
had been submitted to a state administrative agency, whose determination was reviewed by the
state courts.
The Second Circuit has recognized just such a distinction in Title VII cases, Sinicropi v. Nassau
County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979), and in § 1981 cases, Mitchell v. NBC, 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1977).
Moreover, even to the extent that one accepts the Third Circuit's view, the preclusive effect to be
given state judicial review of administrative findings might well differ from that to be accorded
proceedings in which initial factfinding has taken place in ajudicial forum. The reason, for exam-
ple, that exhaustion of state judicial remedies is not required as a prerequisite to federal adjudica-
tion in cases in which exhaustion of state administrative remedies would be required is precisely
because the administrative determination would not preclude later federal adjudication. See
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURIS-
DICTION: A GENERAL Vmw 101 (1973).
192. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
193. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
194. Id. at 105.
195. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
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only when Congress has demonstrated the intention to exclude authori-
tative state adjudication of an issue--either by excepting them from the
full faith and credit statute and the doctrine of preclusion or, perhaps,
by providing exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts19 6 -that a fed-
eral court would not be bound by a prior state determination.
Absent demonstrable legislative intent, it is not sufficient to argue
that the expertise of a federal court or the important federal nature of
the issue involved--the jurisdiction of the federal courts-requires an
exception to the normal rules of preclusion. So, for example, one fed-
eral court has held that a state court's determination that a claim was
barred is entitled to preclusive effect in a later federal proceeding, even
though the basis of the state court's ruling was that under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the claim constituted a compulsory counter-
claim that had not been filed in a previous federal suit. 197 That the
state court, whose judgment was held preclusive, was determining the
application of a federal rule of procedure"9 " was of no moment with
respect to the preclusion issue. As long as the question has been fully
and fairly litigated in the state court, the federal court was bound to
give that determination of federal procedural law full faith and credit
and hence was not free to relitigate it.199
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar result in a case touching yet
more closely on issues of federal jurisdiction. SEC v. United Financial
Group, Inc. 2o was a claim for attorney's fees brought against the fed-
eral receiver of United Financial Group by counsel for the corporation
and its former officers. The attorney had earlier defended a class action
brought in state court by a group of investors.
The federal receiver had objected to the plaintiffs acting as attorney
for the state court defendants and, joined by the SEC, had unsuccess-
fully attempted to enjoin prosecution of the state proceeding. The state
court rendered judgment for the investors but awarded attorney's fees
to the instant plaintiff.?0° The court in a previously instituted state suit
entered summary judgment against the receiver based on that award.
The receiver had appeared in and defended that state court action after
196. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1979); notes 151-53 supra and accompanying
text.
197. Cyclops Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 616 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
198. FED. R. Ctv. P. 13(a).
199. 71 F.R.D. at 622-23.
200. 576 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1978).
201. Id at 219.
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unsuccessfully seeking to remove it to federal district court on the
grounds that 'jurisdiction over an action against a federal receiver re-
sided in the federal court" and that the action could not be maintained
in the absence of leave of the receivership court.202 On appeal, the state
court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, holding the receiver bound
by the award in the original class action and also holding that leave of
the receivership court was not required.0 3
The federal district court to which plaintiff submitted his claim for
attorney's fees on the basis of the state court judgment granted the re-
ceiver's motion for summary judgment. It held, inter alia, that the re-
ceiver was not bound by the state adjudication because the failure to
obtain the consent of the receivership court resulted in a lack of state
court jurisdiction.204 The court of appeals reversed, holding the re-
ceiver bound by the state judgment.20 5 Significantly, the court agreed
with the district court's determination on the merits of the case that
consent to suit was required.206 Nonetheless, because that issue had
been fully and fairly litigated in the state court, the earlier judgment
bound the receivership court.20 7 Although the failure to obtain consent
was not considered a jurisdictional defect, the court noted that "[e]ven
if it were, however, once the issue had been fully and fairly litigated in
the [state] court, the receivership court was bound by that court's deter-
mination, whether correct or not, and was obliged to accord full faith
and credit to its resulting judgment."208 Thus the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that a state court's determination, even of a matter involving po-
tential interference with federal jurisdiction, must be given preclusive
effect in the subsequent federal forum that would normally be pro-
tected from that interference.
The Second Circuit has taken a similar view of the effect to be given
a state court's determination of issues of federal jurisdiction.209 Appel-
lant argued that a state court judgment approving a settlement of a
202. Id
203. Id at 219-20. The state court held the action maintainable without leave of the receiver-
ship court under 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1976), which provides for suits against receivers for acts or
transactions in carrying on business connected with the receivership property.
204. 576 F.2d at 220.
205. Id at 223.
206. Id at 220.
207. Id at 220-21.
208. Id at 221 (citation omitted).
209. Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965) (en bane).
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director's liability in a shareholder's derivative suit should be set aside
because "federal jurisdiction existed . . . and [the federal securities
laws] made such jurisdiction exclusive."21 0 Sitting en banc, the court
was unanimous in finding it "unnecessary to rule on the argument, for
. . . the issue of jurisdiction was raised in and decided by the [state]
courts."2" ' Surely, if a state court's determination concerning the ex-
clusivity vel non of federal jurisdiction is entitled to preclusive effect,
matters of substantial federal concern are less likely to be affected when
the state's jurisdiction is clear.
In sum, although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled definitively on
the precise issue of the preclusive effect to be given prior state court
determinations concerning federal jurisdiction, its latest pronounce-
ments plainly support the proposition that a federal court would be
bound to acquiesce in a state court's determination that the federal
court lacked jurisdiction. As has been demonstrated,"' there is noth-
ing to suggest a state court's lack of capacity to make that determina-
tion. Congress has not provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction to
resolve the issue, nor has it provided an exception to the principles of
preclusion with respect to that issue. Finally, the lower federal courts,
in closely analogous situations, have recognized the competence of the
state courts to determine issues of federal jurisdiction and procedure
and have found those determinations binding on federal courts. Thus,
after a full and fair hearing, a state court's order enjoining litigation in
federal court based upon the federal court's lack of jurisdiction over the
parties or the subject matter would be entitled to preclusive effect in a
subsequent federal proceeding brought in defiance of the injunction.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of state court power to enjoin parties before the court from
prosecuting claims in the federal courts, given the intimacy of its rela-
tionship to principles of comity and federalism, has received surpris-
ingly little attention. The conventional learning is that state courts are
absolutely without power to interfere with federal proceedings, pending
or impending. The basis for the rule is the supremacy of the congres-
sional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over attempts by state
210. Id at 312 n.1.
211. Id
212. See text accompanying notes 92-114 supra.
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courts to interfere with its exercise. The only exception to this blanket
prohibition is for in rem cases in which the state court has first obtained
jurisdiction over the res. The basis for the exception is that the state
court, having first obtained control of the res, has jurisdiction exclusive
of the federal courts to litigate claims affecting that res.
The "rule" and the exception are both manifestations of a single
principle: a state court may not interfere with a litigant's federal right
to a federal forum. Obversely, when the litigant has no such right the
rule is inapplicable. There is no federal bar to a state court's injunction
of federal proceedings if the federal court is without jurisdiction over
the person or the subject matter.
Except in those rare cases in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive,
state courts have the power and the obligation to determine issues of
federal law necessary to the adjudication of cases before them. In the
absence of congressional action providing for exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion to determine the existence of federal judicial power, there is noth-
ing to suggest an exception to the ordinary exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction by state and federal courts (subject, of course, to Supreme
Court review). Thus, state courts have the power to determine the
existence or nonexistence of jurisdiction of a federal court over a par-
ticular case. Furthermore, if the state court determines that federal ju-
dicial power is lacking and that state law requirements for injunctive
relief have been met, it may enjoin the parties before it from proceed-
ing in federal court.
Should the parties defy the injunction, the federal court hosting par-
allel proceedings must give preclusive effect to the state court's determi-
nation and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Recent Supreme Court and
lower federal court decisions support the proposition that a federal
court may not relitigate issues of federal law-even those intimately
bound up in traditionally federal concerns-after a state court, follow-
ing a full and fair hearing, has determined those issues.
A proper appreciation of those principles of comity and federalism
defining the relationship between the state and federal courts recog-
nizes the power of the state to enjoin parties from proceeding with liti-
gation in a federal court that, as a matter of federal law, is without
power to adjudicate. This appreciation further recognizes the power of
the state court to make, as well as bind the parties to, that
determination.
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